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DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS AND ALERTING MODALITIES OF A FLIGHT DECK BASED RUNWAY 
SAFETY ALERTING SYSTEM 
 
Peter M. Moertl, Ph.D. 




This paper presents the results of a human in the loop simulation that evaluated the display of 
runway safety relevant traffic and runway indications and alerts on a cockpit display of traffic 
information (CDTI). The simulation investigated differences between directive versus non-
directive alert types and between an airport map with and without taxiway information. 24 pilots 
evaluated the CDTI in 18 airport surface scenarios that contained conflict opportunities. Findings 
indicate that with directive alerts, pilots avoided all conflict opportunities, while with non-
directive alerts 90 % of conflicts were avoided. Response to directive alerts was generally faster 
than to non-directive alerts. Limitations for non-directive alerts became apparent in scenarios 
where pilots had to respond under time pressure. While pilots preferred taxiway information to be 
displayed on the CDTI, no performance differences were found compared to CDTI’s with taxiway 
information. The paper concludes with implications for the development of avionics standards. 
 
Runway incursions have been a major area of concern for the worldwide aviation community. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) both define 
Runway incursions (RIs) as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle 
or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft (FAA 2008). RIs at 
airports in the United States have been a major area of concern for the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) for the 
past several years.  
Extensive human factors research has been performed to understand the causes leading to runway incursions 
and identified the primary causes for runway incursions by pilots, controllers (e.g. FAA 1998, Adam and Kelly 
1996, Bales, Gillian, & King, 1989; Steinbacher, 1991), or surface vehicle operators.  
Numerous methods have been applied to reduce runway incursions and collisions in the United States (see e.g. 
FAA, 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, Honeywell, 2010). A significant amount of research and 
development activities has been performed on flight deck-based airport surface safety systems (e.g. Jones 2002, 
2005; Jones & Prinzel, 2006; Young & Jones 2000) and avionics standards have been defined (RTCA, 2003, 2009).  
International efforts have included the development of an Advanced Surface Movement Control Guidance System 
(A-SMCGS) to provide surface traffic management, guidance, and alerting functionality to Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) and pilots (see IFATCA 2003; Roeder et al., 2008 and Vernaleken, Urvoy, Klingauf, 2007). 
In 2000 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended the development of a ground 
movement safety system with direct pilot warning capabilities to prevent runway incursions (NTSB, 2000). This 
recommendation motivated the formation of an RTCA sub-working group under the Special Committee 186 for 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) with stakeholders from aviation industry, user 
communities, and governmental organizations to develop a flight deck application to provide direct runway safety 
alerts to the flight crew on a CDTI. The application is named Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the 
Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF IA). The application development was completed and approved in Dec 
2010 (RTCA 2010, DO-323). This paper presents the results of a human in the loop simulation that investigated 
critical human factors questions associated with the development of the SURF IA application.  
 
SURF IA Application Description 
 
The SURF IA application enhances CDTIs to increase their effectiveness in preventing runway incursions. 
While basic CDTIs increase the situation awareness of pilots under many situations, Moertl, McGarry & Nickum 
(2009) identified situations where pilots were not able to use a CDTI to prevent runway incursions. Specifically, 
during take-off operations, and while on final approach and landing on a runway, pilots were sometimes unable to 
detect runway safety problems even with a CDTI available to them. In addition, while CDTIs display large amounts 
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of information under many situations, this abundance of information on a relatively small display, requires pilot 
cognitive resources to extract the relevant information. During times when pilots have less “spare” cognitive 
resources available, such as during critical flight phases, the usefulness of a CDTI for incursion preventions appears 
limited.  
  
Figure 1 Example for a SURF IA Indication (left) and a SURF IA Warning Alert (right) 
The SURF IA application addresses these limitations in two ways. First, the SURF IA application “indicates” 
to pilots safety relevant traffic. SURF IA indications increase saliency of runway safety relevant traffic under normal 
operational situations. Second, SURF IA alerts facilitate pilots’ immediate awareness and immediate response once 
an actual collision hazard has been detected. SURF IA provides caution and warning type alerts that are compatible 
with FAA guidance on the design of alerts on the flight deck (FAA 2011). Both alert types provide immediate flight 
crew awareness but require different pilot responses. While warning alerts require an immediate flight crew 
response, caution alerts require a subsequent pilot response. See Figure 1 for example SURF IA indications and 
alerts. 
The simulation the MITRE Corporation’s Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD) 
performed were preceded by a series of three human in the loop simulations that assessed various aspects of SURF 
IA and are described elsewhere (see Moertl, McGarry & Nickum, 2009, and McGarry & Helleberg, 2011). These 
initial simulations evaluated various design characteristics of SURF IA indications and alerts that were implemented 
for the simulation described below. 
 
Simulation Research Questions 
 
This simulation focused on two primary research questions:  
1. Should SURF IA alerts be directive or non-directive? Directive alerts include information for the flight crew on 
how to resolve a conflict, whereas non-directive alerts inform the flight crew only about the existence of a 
detected conflict. It was hypothesized that directive alerts would be more effective and preferred by pilots over 
non-directive alerts because they would decrease pilots’ demand on cognitive resources during response 
selection. Also, it was hypothesized that pilots would seek more confirming information when responding to 
non-directive alerts than to directive alert where they may just follow the resolution. Accordingly, pilots should 
be better able to recover from a false non-directive alert than from a false directive alert because they are 
expected to utilize additional visual or auditory information.  
2. Is it permissible for the SURF IA system to be displayed on a CDTI with just runway information or does it 
require a complete airport surface map (including taxiways)? It was hypothesized that CDTIs with taxiway 
information would be more effective and preferred by pilots over CDTIs without taxiway information. 
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In the remainder of this paper, the two display conditions are referred to by their names as avionics 
standards as defined in RTCA DO-317, RTCA (2009). The term FAROA (Final Approach Runway Occupancy 
Awareness) is used for a CDTI that displays runway but not taxiway information. The term ASSA (Airport Surface 
Situational Awareness) is used for a CDTI that includes runway and taxiway information. 
Method 
The simulation was performed in MITRE/CAASD’s fix-based simulator with a 120 degree out the window 
view and configured with a primary flight and navigation displays. The simulator did not replicate a specific aircraft 
type but resembled a large, transport category aircraft. 
The CDTI was shown on an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) mounted in the left forward field of view for the left 
seat pilot and in the right forward field of view for the right seat pilot. Both displays could be seen without need for 
extensive head turning. Pilots listened to radio communication with other traffic from which they could form a 
mental image of the traffic environment. A former air traffic controller gave them clearances. The crew used a 
standard printed checklist that prompted questions and responses between the two pilots. Preflight preparations were 
simplified and did not include weight and balance calculations or programming the Flight Management System 
(FMS).  
Experimental Design 
Two independent variables were used. The variable “alert type” consisted of two levels, “directive alerts” 
versus “non-directive alerts” and was a within-subjects variable. The second variable “display type” had also two 
levels, “ASSA” (runway and taxiways) versus “FAROA” (runway only) and was a between-subjects variable. Alert 
type and display type conditions were counterbalanced and randomized across participants to account for order 
effects. 
Scenarios 
After having completed two initial familiarization scenarios, participants completed eight scenarios in each 
alert type condition. One group of pilots saw these 16 scenarios with the ASSA display type, the other group of 
pilots saw them in the FAROA display type. Visibility conditions were such that pilots could not determine conflict 
traffic by looking out the window. After completion of all 16 scenarios, participants completed two additional 
scenarios.  The first additional scenario showed pilots the alternate display type to what they had seen previously. 
The final scenario was a “false alert” scenario where a warning alert was presented to pilots after take-off initiation, 
without the existence of an actual conflict. In that scenario, visibility conditions were such that pilots could visually 
determine that no conflict existed by looking out the window. 
Participants 
Twenty-four pilots participated between February and March, 2009. All pilots had experience as airline pilots 
and averaged 11,000 logged flight hours (ranging from 1,300 hrs to 21,800 hrs). Pilots flew a variety of airplanes 
including Boeing 717, 747, 777, 767, 757, MacDonald Douglas 80, Airbus 320/319, CRJ 700/900, EMB145, and 
CL-65. Two of the pilots were female; the rest were male. Participants were assigned by the study director to their 
role as pilot flying or pilot not-flying, depending on their qualifications and prior experience. The pilot flying took 
the left seat and the pilot not-flying took the right seat.  
Results 
Directive versus Non-Directive Alerting 
The effectiveness of pilot response to the alerts was measured by counting flight crew responses that were 
appropriate to remove the safety hazard that the scenarios introduced. Safety hazards included conflict aircraft 
moving onto the runway ahead of ownship, accelerating toward ownship, or failing to clear a runway. Pilots could 
avoid such safety hazards by aborting their take-off, initiating a go-around, or clearing the runway. Such responses 
were counted as “effective.”  Any other response was counted as “ineffective.” 
Overall, pilots responded effectively to non-directive alerts in 53 of 59 conflict trials (90 %). Originally 60 
conflict trials were presented but in one trial the auditory alert did not sound and this trial was dismissed. In 
comparison, the same pilots responded effectively to directive alerts in all 60 conflict trials (100%). The difference 
of 10 % is statistically significant between the two types of alert responses (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.05). This 
supported the hypothesis that directive alerts would lead to more effective alert responses than non-directive alerts.  
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Four of the ineffective responses to the non-directive warnings occurred during departure scenarios, when 
pilots had little time to decide on an action and therefore had to response under time pressure.  These pilots 
continued their take-off even with the non-directive alerts coming on. Those flight crews reported that they were 
aware of the conflict aircraft ahead, but were avoiding an abort at high speed. The alerts sounded when ownship was 
above 80 knots but before reaching V1 speed (takeoff decision speed). Two crews mentioned they thought the 
remaining runway length was insufficient to stop the aircraft.  
The two remaining ineffective alert responses occurred during approach and landing scenarios. In these cases, 
pilots either did not initiate go-around maneuvers, or did not attempt to exit the runway in time to clear the runway 
for an approaching aircraft from behind. During the final phase in an approach scenario, one of the pilots 
misattributed the alert to a proximate aircraft that in fact had not caused the conflict. In another scenario, the flight 
crew had landed and was taxiing on the runway when the alert was triggered by an aircraft behind them. The alert 
surprised the flying pilot who did not immediately comprehend that the conflict was caused by an approaching 
aircraft from behind. Therefore, the pilot decided to stop on the runway.  
Ineffective responses did not appear to result from lack of familiarity with the alerting system. Half of the 
ineffective responses occurred during the first half of the simulation and the other half occurred during the second 
half. Therefore, run order apparently did not have an impact on response effectiveness. 
Though overall, there were no differences in response times to directive versus non-directive alerts, response 
times were different only between types of operations. Response times were defined as the time between the onset of 
the alert and changes in throttle position resulting from a go-around or aborted take-off. Over all types of scenarios 
combined, there were no significant differences in response times to directive and non-directive alerts (3.7 sec vs. 
4.5 sec, respectively). For departure operations it was found that pilots responded to directive alerts significantly 
faster than to non-directive alerts (F (1, 34) = 9.63, p<.01, 2.9 sec vs. 4.0 sec respectively). No response time 
differences were observed during arrival scenarios. Average alert response times in arrival scenarios were slower 
(4.8 sec) than in departure scenarios (3.5 sec) but this was not a statistically significant difference.  In the arrival 
scenarios, pilots tended to have more time available to respond when the alert came on, as compared to in the 
departure scenarios. 
Pilots generally thought directive alerts were more useful than non-directive alerts, though this trend only 
reached statistical significance for landing and exit scenarios where flight crews reported directive alerts to be more 
useful than non-directive alerts (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.05). Also, pilots indicated that directive alerts were easier 
to respond to than non-directive alerts (Fisher’s exact test p < 0.001). Based on the described performance, pilot 
perceptions, and response time differences, it appeared that directive alerts led to faster, easier, and more effective 
responses than non-directive alerts.  
Responses to False Alerts. To measure the extent to which flight crews relied on the displayed alert 
information versus seeking other confirming information (e.g., via out the window, CDTI, or radio) when selecting 
their response, flight crews saw a false alert in their last simulation scenario. Only two flight crews did not abort 
their take-off in response to the alert. One aborted in the directive alerting condition and the other one in the non-
directive alert condition. This contradicts the hypothesis that pilots would be better able to recover from false non-
directive alerts than from false directive alerts.  
ASSA versus FAROA Display 
Most pilots (21 of 24) preferred the ASSA display over the FAROA display. Pilots thought that the ASSA 
displays supported the task of navigating on the airport surface better with taxiway and runway information. 
Accordingly, the majority of pilots (20 of the 24 pilots, i.e. 83 %) found taxiway information on the ASSA display 
was useful when specifically asked about the value of taxiway information. A few pilots indicated during interviews 
that while taxiway information was useful when operating on the ground, it was not needed when flying an approach 
to the runway. 
 
While pilots subjectively preferred the ASSA display, no evidence was found that pilots exhibited superior 
performance over the FAROA display. There was no significant difference between the number of ineffective 
responses between the ASSA and FAROA display conditions (3 ineffective responses using ASSA versus 2 using 
FAROA). Also, self-reported workload as measured by questions from the NASA task load index (TLX) showed no 
differences between ASSA and FAROA and ranged between 3 and 4 on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). The 
average situation awareness rating was 5.5 on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), and there were no differences 
between the display conditions.  
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Conclusions 
The pilots in this simulation were able to successfully avoid 90 % of the presented runway safety conflicts 
using non-directive alerts, less than when presented with directive alerts when they avoided all conflicts. Limitations 
of non-directive alerts only became apparent in situations when pilots had to respond under time pressure or the 
appropriate response was not immediately apparent. Response times to non-directive alerts tended to be slower than 
to directive alerts and responses, but were only significantly slower during departure scenarios. During takeoff, pilot 
responses to a false alert were similar for both directive and non-directive alerts, with most pilots aborting their take-
off.  Pilots did not retrieve other confirming visual or auditory information (e.g. via out-the-window, CDTI, or radio) 
that would have let them know there was no actual conflict.  This could be caused by the fact that, under time 
pressure, information search cannot be exhaustive. These findings suggest that the tested directive alerts were more 
effective than non-directive alerts for the prevention of runway incursions in the given scenarios and conditions, and 
that pilots did not recover any better from false non-directive alerts than they did from false directive alerts. System 
implementations that opt for directive alerting will need to consider the technical feasibility of directive alerting 
which was not part of this study. 
The pilots in this simulation subjectively preferred a CDTI with taxiway information over a CDTI without 
taxiway information. However, there were no significant differences in observed pilot workload, situation awareness, 
and performance found between the two different CDTI display conditions. Therefore, while an ASSA display with 
taxiway appears desirable, a FAROA display without taxiway information appeared to be acceptable for the tested 
scenarios.  
The results of this simulation were used as input into the development of safety and performance standards 
for the SURF IA application (RTCA DO-323, Dec 8, 2010). To support generalization of these simulation findings 
and to further validate the SURF IA application requirements, these simulation results should be combined with a 
larger body of research that evaluates the certification requirements for a surface cockpit alerting capability.  
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